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Abstract
This commentary argues that the observed heterogeneity in fairness
views, documented in many economic experiments, poses a challenge to
the partner choice theory developed by Baumard, Andre´ and Sperber. It
also discusses the extent to which their theory can explain how people
consider inequalities due to pure luck.
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1 Heterogeneity in fairness views
In their fascinating paper ”A mutalistic approach to morality”, Nicolas Baumard,
Jean-Baptiste Andre´ and Dan Sperber develop an approach to morality where
morality is seen as a result of adaption to an environment where people compete
for partners in mutually advantageous interactions. The core idea is that when
there is an efficient market for partners, cooperation between partners only takes
place when partners are given the marginal value of their contribution. The
authors argue that the observed prominence in many distributive situations of the
meritocratic fairness view, where individuals share the benefits from cooperation
in proportion to the effort and talent they invest in the interaction, is the result of
adaption to such a process of partner choice. An important part of the authors’
argument is based on results from economic experiments such as the dictator
game, and in this commentary we question some of the conclusions they draw
on the basis of these results. In particular we shall argue that the observed
heterogeneity in fairness views, documented in a number of experiments, poses a
challenge to the partner choice theory they develop.
Many of the experiments discussed by the authors are dictator games where
the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase such that the money
to be distributed is earned (Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden,
2007; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Konow, 2000). A key feature of
these experiments is that they allow the researchers to study how the partic-
ipants respond to different types of inequalities in earnings. To illustrate, in
Alma˚s, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010) we report the results from a
dictator game where each participant’s earnings in the production phase is de-
termined by how many points she or he produces and by a randomly determined
price. By studying the behavior in the distribution phase, where the dictator
distributes the total earnings between her- or himself and the other participant,
we are able to estimate the prevalence of three distinct fairness views: egalitar-
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ians (who always find it fair to distribute equally), meritocrats (who find it fair
to distribute in proportion to production) and libertarians (who find it fair to
distribute in proportion to earnings). An important result from this experiment,
and numerous other experiments we have conducted with co-authors (Cappelen
et al., 2007; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010; Cappelen, Drange Hole,
Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2011; Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen, and Tungodden,
forthcoming), is that there is considerable pluralism in the fairness views that
motivate the participants; we consistently find a non-trivial shares of participants
who choose in accordance with each of the three fairness views. There appears, in
other words, to be considerable disagreement about what are legitimate sources
of inequality in distributive situations.
In contrast, the mutualistic hypothesis posits that humans are all equipped
with the same sense of fairness. Baumard, Andre´ and Sperber argue that people
may still distribute resources differently for two reasons. First, people do not
necessarily have the same beliefs about the source of an inequality; second, peo-
ple do not necessarily face the same distributive situations (and a fairness view
may have different implications in different situations). We agree that these two
reasons potentially can explain much inter-individual and cross-cultural variabil-
ity in distributive behavior, but they cannot explain the behavioral variability
observed in the economic experiments described above. These experiments are
designed so that all participants have the same, and correct, beliefs about the
sources of inequalities in earnings and all participants face the same distribu-
tive situations. More work is therefore needed to explain how the mutualistic
approach can accommodate heterogeneity in distributive behavior even in such
situations.
Another important insight from these dictator games with a production phase
is that there is a non-neglige share of the participants who follow a libertarian
fairness view, i.e. who consider fair even inequalities due to pure luck. In our
work we have consistently found that 20-30 percent of the participants hold this
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fairness view. This result seems to conflict with the claim made by the authors
that we all share same common logic of rewarding people according to their effort
and abilities, but not according to luck.
As a final comment we would like to encourage the authors to address in
more detail what they think their model of partner choice implies with respect
to inequalities due to pure luck. The authors take great care in explaining why
adaption to an environment where people compete for partners in mutually ad-
vantageous interactions results in a fairness view that rewards individual effort
and talent. They do not, however, explain why the same process does not result
in a fairness view that also rewards pure luck. The basic mechanism underlying
their partner choice model is that potential partners must be rewarded with the
marginal value of their contribution to the interaction as long as partners are
mobile. Given this mechanism, it seems to follow that partners also should be
rewarded for contributions that reflect pure luck. In other words, it seems that a
truly mutualistic process should make us all libertarians.
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